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Introduction
Both political party assistance and research on political party assistance are very new topics.
As a particular component of international democracy assistance, support for political parties was "discovered" surprisingly late, after the assistance of civil society and democratic institutions. In the literature on democracy assistance the term "political party assistance" was used by Thomas Carothers (1999) for the first time, as a chapter heading, only in 1999. His controversial critique of the "transition paradigm" in democracy promotion in 2002 came along with a strong plea for political party assistance (Carothers 2002) . Despite the fact that it was generally agreed that political parties were "indispensable" for democracy, and that some sort of international support for political parties took place before 1999, as a conceptual part in its own right political party assistance remained marginal and even controversial within the wider framework of democracy promotion. The academic literature on political party assistance is even younger. Only since 2004 has the number of publications on the topic started to increase. Most of the publications were basic systematic explorations of the issues involved, such as: What is party assistance? Who are the major actors? What are their instruments, concepts, and strategies? 1 However, as pointed out by Peter Burnell (2006a) , the practitioners of party assistance and the established research on political parties and party systems remained in two different worlds. While some political scientists with an expertise in Western political parties and party systems were providing advice and background information to political party assistance agencies, these interactions are poorly documented and research on the topic was basically nonexistent. Our knowledge of political party assistance and its effects was based initially on commissioned reports and evaluations of donor agencies, and on the insights of researchers collecting the evaluations.
Only recently has systematic research on political party assistance started that takes the findings of research on political parties in non-Western societies into account. 2 In fact, some of the problems of political party aid-providers might be attributed to the advice they took from established political science research on political parties with its particular Western European bias. And again only recently, following Thomas Carothers' (2006b) critique of international political party assistance as the "weakest link" and some paradoxical experiences and controversial results of the same kind, have some party assistance agencies started to consult political scientists with research experience on non-European political parties, in order to reconsider and possibly reshape their approaches.
This raises the question of what political science research on political parties can offer to political party assistance, in order to help it solve its problems. Related to this question are a number of additional questions such as: What do we actually know about the functioning of non-Western European political parties? An example is the "clientelistic parties" 3 that operate in non-industrialized societies in which the majority of the population often lives in poverty and with a very small middle class, whose professionals usually perform the role of organizers. What do we know about the institutional development of these parties? Is it possible to transform, for example, an "ethnic congress party" 4 or a "clientelistic party" into a traditional mass or a modern electoralist party, and how can that be achieved?
The issues involved in bringing international political party assistance and political party research closer together will be approached here in four main sections. The first section describes the major actors in international political party assistance and the problems that they 1 An example is Burnell (2004) . 2 See the forthcoming special issue of Democratization: "Promoting party politics in emerging democracies" (2010) . 3 A clientelistic party is formed by a group of ("modern" or "traditional") notables each with its own personality-based support built on loyalty and linked with the direct exchange of services and material benefits; Gunther and Diamond (2001: 14-15) ; Kitschelt (1995) ; Kitschelt et al. (1999: 47-53) . 4 An ethnic congress party is formed by an elite coalition of distinct ethnic groups; it is different from an ethnic party, which is based predominantly on one ethnic group only; Gunther and Diamond (2001: 22-25) .
experience. The second section examines the extant research on political party assistance, which remains very limited in scope. The third and most substantive section then explains the particular importance of political science research, focusing on its contribution to our understanding of the role of political parties in the transition from authoritarian rule and in the consolidation of democracy, while identifying a significant knowledge gap in existing research regarding our understanding of political parties and of political party systems in non-Western societies. Finally, the main arguments are summarized in the conclusion. In attempting to explain the problems and failures of political party assistance, my contention is twofold: first, political party promoters lack sound policy strategies and do not have adequate evaluation policies. Second, it is problematic not only that practitioners and political scientists work in isolation from each other, but also that political science research currently lacks the appropriate systematic knowledge about political parties outside of the Western world.
Promoters and Policies
Promoters of political party assistance are, above all, political party foundations in Europe and the United States, who are usually engaged in democracy assistance in general (for example, Carothers 2006b; Van Wersch and de Zeeuw 2005) . There are also a number of small foundations in various European countries that are exclusively engaged in political party assistance (not necessarily financial assistance), for example the Alfred Mozer Foundation in the Netherlands; since the late 1990s party assistance has furthermore been provided by some multilateral organizations such as the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 5 Most of the European foundations were formed only in reaction to the events in and around the German Democratic Republic in 1989. The same applies to the three US institutes that operate in the democracy assistance field. They started with political party aid only during the 1990s: the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The first two receive funds from the NED as well as from the USAID, the US Department of State, and other sources; the NED, too, calls itself a nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization. It was founded as a result of an initiative by the US government during the presidency of Ronald Reagan and receives its funds from the government with the approval of the US Congress. The various organizations' experience with political party assistance is limited, because most of their activities started only in the early 1990s. Only the older German political foundations, well known for their close affiliation with German political parties and for their partisan approach, have experience in 8 Erdmann: Political Party Research and Political Party Assistance party assistance that spans over four decades. However, this particular knowledge has not been documented or analyzed-it is lost (Erdmann 2006: 197f) .
Closely related to this problem is that hardly any of the political party promoters operate with what can be called a proper concept or strategy. Many claim, of course, that they have one, but usually they cannot provide any written source for such a claim; or if they have an outline for their operations, then it does not deserve the name "strategy" (for example, Erdmann 2006; Carothers 2006b)-that is, if the understanding is that a strategy should consist of a clearly defined goal, a reason why this goal has been chosen, clear instructions for targetoriented action, and, perhaps, what sort of action should be avoided. The absence of clearly articulated concepts and strategies also leads to a lack of criteria to evaluate the success or failure of the assistance-or it at least makes it difficult. At the same time, the writer's own conversations with practitioners suggests there is no total agreement on what political party assistance includes and what it excludes: for example, should the training of members of parliament be included under the umbrella of party assistance, given that most of them are members of political parties and the parliamentary caucus of the parties might benefit? Or is that rather part of the assistance to parliament, as the legislative branch of government?
In general, political party assistance aims at political parties and party systems that stabilize, sustain, and consolidate democracy; this may include supporting the efforts of political parties to democratize electoral authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Because political parties in young democracies and hybrid regimes are perceived as "weak" and therefore rather "dysfunctional" for democracy, the external assistance aims to change these parties into "strong" parties that are "functional" for (consolidating) democracy. 6 The aim of party assistance can also comprise a change in the party system, not only by changing the parties as parts of the system, but also changing how they interact with each other; hence a polarized party system, which might endanger democratic development, ought to be changed into a moderate competitive system in which parties interact in a more non-confrontational manner. Carothers (2006b: 163) has termed these envisaged changes the "transformative impact" of party assistance.
As "outsiders," political scientists provided some order for the different approaches and methods applied by the various assistance agencies; it is interesting to note that none of them have a strong background in traditional political party research. They suggested useful distinctions, for example, between "party-to-party relations" (the "partisan approach"), the "multi-party approach," "cross-party dialogue," the "institutional approach," and international cross-party collaboration, to which I would add the "civil society approach" (Burnell 2004: 9ff) . 7 Also, commentators like Carothers (2008) have made a distinction between the 6 On the concept of hybrid regimes see Karl (1995) ; the conceptual discussion in Bendel, Croissant, and Rüb (2002) ; Diamond (2002) ; see also the contribution by Bolleyer and Storm in this collection. 7 The civil society approach means support for particular civil society organizations that are close to political parties, such as trade unions that are often affiliated with social democratic parties. "standard method," which targets political parties directly and includes some of the approaches just mentioned, and the wider "party system aid," which addresses the institutional framework for the operation of political parties (electoral system, party law, party financing, and so on). Most of the party assistance providers rely on a combination of approaches, not on one main approach as might be suspected in the case of the German foundations, which are often identified with the partisan approach. In fact, some of the German foundations started to refocus on political parties only over the last couple of years, while in the 1990s their focus was rather more on civil society than on political parties, and some do not even support political parties at all (Erdmann 2006: 188f) . The actual activities of party assistance providers are characterized by the following "standard method"; as Carothers (2008: 7) puts it:
Organizations that implement party aid start by getting to know the parties in a new or struggling democracy, find that the parties do not conform to the ideas that the aid groups have about what constitutes a good political party, and design assistance programs to try to reshape them along those lines. This is done primarily by transferring knowledge through training on topics like party building or electoral campaigning. Although training efforts are diversifying over time, they have long relied on very conventional methods typified by the two-or three-day workshop, seminar, or conference led by a few experts flown in from the sponsoring country. Other common party assistance tools include exchange visits and advice.
There is, in general, also very little information available on which particular field and approach the party assistance is focused on within its own framework. A study by van Wersch (Table 1) . For the implementation of the approaches, about 56 percent of the expenditure is spent on "training," 14 percent, on "advice and technical assistance," 12 percent on "seminars and conferences," and about 18 percent on a variety of other, unspecified activities (ibid.: 16). These general figures suggest that if the support for party organization, the participation of women, and the political parties in parliament are taken together, a major push towards institutional assistance or what might be termed as "institutionalizing political parties" can be identified. However, this is no more than a rough speculation, because we do not have solid knowledge about the exact figures, attributions, and aims of the particular projects and programs; also, the categories used for the analysis are very broad-for example, party programs and the party-society linkage are not mentioned. The knowledge we have about political party assistance is not based on systematic political science research projects. Such knowledge is only slowly being compiled, 9 but the provision of hard statistical data remains only patchy. Most of the evaluation reports and commissioned studies of assistance agencies are not available to the public. Our knowledge is largely based on critical assessments of political scientists who were in one way or the other involved in the evaluation or implementation of political party assistance projects, or who were conducting their own small research projects. 10 From these studies a number of conceptual and practical problems of political party assistance can be summarized:
• The assistance guidelines and policies are based on a Western European party modelregardless of whether the assistance agency is in the US or in Europe.
• This is a "mythic model," as Thomas Carothers has termed it, because it is the out-of-date model of the mass party of the first half of the twentieth century in Western Europe. It is 9 See the forthcoming special issue of Democratization: "Promoting party politics in emerging democracies" (2010). Erdmann: Political Party Research and Political Party Assistance not only outdated, but reflects only in parts the bygone reality of political parties in European democracies; it is remarkable that US agencies apply this model as well, even though they have a different tradition and reality today.
• Applying the mass party model implies also that party assistance is based on a particular model of party sequences, which is derived from the historical development of political parties in industrialized Western Europe-from the elite to the mass party, to the catchall, electoral-professional, cartel and, perhaps, to the evolution of new movement parties.
However, this particular sequencing cannot be expected to occur in other parts of the world in the same way, as already indicated by the example of the US.
• The overall implication is that political party assistance comes with a concept that has very little, or even nothing, to do with the societal context in which it is supposed to function.
Consequently, there are a number of practical weaknesses in the implementation of party assistance, summarized by Carothers (2006b: 120-27) as stale techniques of institutional modeling:
• Too short and ill-conceived training workshops isolated from day-to-day concerns of the participants.
• Frequently ill-chosen participants with no real interest in the training (cronies of party leaders).
• "Fly-in" experts (political consultants, parliamentarians, or professors) without substantial knowledge of the local context.
• Workshop topics chosen by aid providers, reflecting "Western" rather than local needs.
• Repetitive training programs without deepening the subject.
Noting the conceptual and practical shortcomings of political party assistance, it is surprising that the evaluation of its effects does not only come to negative conclusions. For assistance providers are usually convinced that their work has a positive impact. Independent observers share a more critical assessment. Carothers sees hardly any evidence for "transformative effects," while others observe modest, marginal, or mixed effects at best. 11 Based on the evaluation of the USAID party assistance in Middle and Eastern Europe, Krishna Kumar (2004) found positive effects in organizational development, but poor results regarding the role of parties in parliament.
Carothers' critique addresses the heart of the problem: political party assistance aimsalthough not explicitly stated, but implicitly it is quite clear-at an institutional transformation of political parties that do not show the characteristics of the mythic mass party model.
He observed what is difficult to disprove: that after years or even a decade of party assistance, the political parties in the post-Communist and non-European world still show the same deficits as before-deficits that were perceived as the cause for party assistance. He also refers to the ongoing crisis of political parties in Latin America. The party assistance (Carothers 2006b: 164f) . This critical assessment could be judged as overdone, based on criteria that are unjustified and too demanding, and one could argue that political party assistance was, in terms of funding, too marginal. However, such a refutation of the critique cannot deny a major shortcoming in political party assistance, which is that it provides no strategic goals that might serve as criteria for a more appropriate assessment of its impact. This brings us to the question of what political science can offer for a better assessment and design of political party assistance.
Research on Political Party Assistance
As indicated above, political party assistance is a new agenda and political science research on the topic is thus scant. Even within the wider agenda of democracy promotion, party assistance remained "marginal, or […] too invisible" to be the subject of controversy (Burnell 2006a: 5) . There are basically no publications or publicly-accessible works that date back beyond 2004, 12 while a few older publications on democracy promotion made just cursory references to party assistance. 13 There are and were, of course, a few political scientists involved as experts in political party assistance, as far back as the 1970s and 1980s, but although involved in giving advice and training they did not conduct any research on the topic, which was unknown as a field of its own in development assistance until the turn of the twenty-first century.
As mentioned in the introduction, the literature on the topic has been little more than a systematic stock-taking of the new field. One reason for this state of affairs is that until recently there has been only a handful of political scientists interested in this particular and marginal field, and even then it was not their only or major academic concern. At the same time, none of them had a background in the established political science subdiscipline of party research, although a few had research experience with non-European political parties. Hence, our accumulated body of knowledge about political party assistance is small. Even what we seem to know about political party assistance is very general and undiscriminating, and not based on systematic empirical research but rather on "thick" empirical experience and evidence from only a few selected cases. Carothers (2006b) , in his Confronting the Weakest Link, draws on much more than most: his cases are drawn from several countries in Africa, Europe, Latin America, and Asia, and range from Morocco to Guatemala, and from Russia to Mozambique.
Although the lack of research is clearly a major reason for this unsatisfactory state of affairs, three further points can be made. One is the general causation or attribution problem in political science. It is generally difficult to relate particular provisions of democracy assis-12 Burnell (2001; 2006a; 2006c) ; Carothers (2004; 2006a; ); Erdmann (2006); Kumar (2004; ; Van Wersch and de Zeeuw (2004; . 13 Carothers (1996), for example, devoted around 10 pages to party assistance in Romania.
tance to specific effects within a political system; external democracy promotion is only one factor among many others within a system that might contribute to changes in the political system. To "measure" the impact of external democracy assistance on democratization processes has proven an extremely difficult undertaking. Secondly, some of the difficulties spring also from the fact that there is usually not one "homogeneous" external actor, but a multitude of them, whose actions can even contradict each other. Moreover, political party assistance is usually only one component of democracy assistance, a marginal one, and the local political parties are, again, only one internal factor that impacts on political development.
This indicates the magnitude of the challenge faced in identifying, beyond plausible guesswork, the effects of political party assistance.
Apart from this general observation related to political science research, there are two other issues for which the assistance agencies are responsible. One is that the assistance agencies have commissioned only a limited number of studies and evaluation reports on political party assistance; the numbers are increasing now but the "evaluation culture" has long been underdeveloped in this particular field of democracy assistance (Carothers 2004: 169) . 14 The other reason rests in the lack of a clear, conceptual, and strategic orientation in party assistance, which in turn leads to a lack of success or impact criteria. The same usually applies to the terms of reference, which are often too general to allow for a plausible estimate of causes and effects (for example, Mair 2000b). The many small "items" of party assistancetraining workshops, seminars, exchange visits, and so on-make an impact analysis even more difficult, if not impossible. The problems can be summed up by saying that evaluating the performance of party assistance is probably inherently difficult, because of the various conceptual and methodological issues, and because too little attention has been devoted to addressing these issues as they apply to the study of party assistance.
Political Party Research
The question of what the scholarship on political parties and party systems can offer to international party assistance has closely related theoretical, conceptual, and empirical dimensions. The two issues to be addressed are: (1) the role of political parties in the transition process and the consolidation of democracy, and (2) 
Controversial Roles
According to the literature on political parties and on democratization, political parties play a key role in democratization and in the democratic polity; a role that no other institution can perform. Bartolini and Mair (2001: 339) emphasize the integration of various institutional orders and political processes and identify five core processes: 1) the electoral process, 2) the channeling of organized or corporate interests, 3) the legislative process in parliament, 4) the formation of the executive, and 5) policy-making. Other scholars have identified more functions, but these five can be considered to be the "core" functions that are acknowledged by most scholars. 15 The crucial point here is that the core processes are not only attributed to political parties in functioning democratic polities but also to parties in the process of democratization and democratic consolidation. The implication is that while political parties and party systems are not institutionalized and consolidated themselves, they are expected-theoretically-to perform a crucial additional role or "service": to be the driving force for the consolidation of other partial regimes of democracy or at least for the "systemic integration" of a "wide-ranging set of institutions and processes" (Bartolini and Mair 2001: 339; Merkel 1997: 13; Biezen 2003: 6) .
This proposition about the overarching role of political parties in consolidating democratic polities can be questioned from two angles, one theoretical and one empirical. First, can we expect political parties within young democracies to not only drive the institutionalization of themselves, but also the consolidation of the party system, and to contribute to the consolidation of other partial regimes even when they are weak and lack institutionalization themselves? Under authoritarian rule, political parties usually suffer just like other organizations and institutions and either have to "rebuild" or completely reorganize during and after democratization; at the same time, some of the former "state parties" might have survived the transition to democracy and proceeded to act in ways that are unhelpful to further democratic advance. The role-ascription of the overall consolidating function of political parties seems to be related to well-developed and functionally-differentiated (social democratic) "super parties" of established democracies of Western and Northern Europe, where these "super parties" already perform all the core functions in one or more measures. But this ascription could be too ambitious and misleading.
In fact, the claim that political parties play the crucial role in the consolidation of democracy has been challenged by Philippe Schmitter (1999; , who argues his point using evidence from Eastern Europe and Latin America. In both these contexts, he finds consolidated democracies with weakly-institutionalized parties and party systems that also exhibit a very high degree of volatility. The empirical evidence about the parties and party systems, particularly for Eastern Europe, has been largely confirmed by other scholars (for example, Ágh 15 For example, Schmitter (1999: 479f; : 72f) identifies four core "functions": structuring electoral competition, providing symbolic identity, forming governments, aggregating interests and passions; he also mentions a number of other "functions" that parties can perform.
2006). They, however, differ about the state of the democracy: some qualify the Eastern European democracies as "consolidated" (Merkel 2010: 418) , others argue that because there are "floating" (not institutionalized, highly volatile) party systems, the democracies cannot be viewed as consolidated (Rose and Munro 2009: 47ff) . Meanwhile, Schmitter's view on the Latin American cases as consolidated democracies has been challenged; some are regarded as "delegative democracies" and a few even as having become authoritarian regimes-and, apart from the Chilean democracy, all the other cases are linked to weak political parties and even collapsed party systems, as in Venezuela and Peru (Merkel 2010: 254ff) . Beyond this debate about the third wave democracies, there are cases of old democracies, too, such as the US and India, which suggest that consolidating democracy is possible with something other than the Western European "super parties" and party systems.
Regardless of which argument one follows about the state of democracy, the role of political parties and party systems in the process of democratization and consolidation remains an enigma for scholars. It underscores the question above about whether young political parties and party systems can perform the overall consolidating function for democracy. To raise this question is not to say that political parties can be neglected or that they do not play a role; political parties and party systems certainly contribute to the consolidation of democracy, but their importance might have been overestimated, and the issue should be addressed in more specific terms. For example, there might be a "minimum" or particular degree of party or party system consolidation required, and, perhaps, only a small or core number of political parties are necessary; or a particular type of political parties might be important for providing the overall consolidating performance; or the consolidating effects of parties and party systems might be dependent on a specific combination or interplay with other institutions-for example, a wellorganized and articulated civil society. All in all, political party scholarship currently cannot provide a satisfying and empirically based answer to the question of what the role of political parties is, or what their most effective pattern is along with other institutions for democratization and consolidation. In general, it cannot be expected that the political parties that emerged during the third wave of democratization within societal contexts different from that of Western Europe will develop the same features and capacities as in the older democracies.
Before turning to the accumulated knowledge on political parties, two further issues must be addressed. One is the Western European bias, the other the dominant functionalist approach in political party research. Neither is a moot point, but rather they are closely related to political party assistance approaches-for example, to the choice of the "mythic" reference model mentioned above, which directly affects the aims and designs of assistance approaches.
Only more recently has the established scholarly literature of political party research acknowledged that it takes its terms of reference and models primarily from Western European historical experience; in short, that its concepts are determined by a Western European bias (Bartolini and Mair 2001: 338; Kitschelt 1995; Erdmann 2004) . For example, the traditional inventory of political party types, most of which are related to a particular era, comprised the 16 Erdmann: Political Party Research and Political Party Assistance "elite party" of the nineteenth century; or, the "mass party" or "cadre party" dated from the late nineteenth century up to the 1960s. Finally, there is the "catch-all party," which emerged after World War II, and the "cartel" and the "electoral-professional parties" or "cadre parties" that have been developing since the 1970s (Katz and Mair 1994; Panebianco 1998). 16 After the experience of political parties and party systems that evolved during the third wave of democratization, especially in Southern and Eastern Europe, the conceptual limitations changed. 17 For example, a whole range of new party types were "invented" by Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond (2001: 9-30 Interwoven with this conceptual issue is a methodological one. Political party scholarship is largely dominated by functionalist analysis. 18 The functionalist approach is indispensable in political party research, but it has its own particular research questions and perspectives which do not seem to be very helpful for determining the requirements of political party assistance. Functionalist analysis does not seek to explain "why" something happens or comes into being and "how" it develops and changes-these are considered to be historical questions. With the help of the functionalist approach, we can establish whether a particular party and party system is "functioning" or not as a maintainer and consolidator of the democratic polity. The reference frame for what is functioning or not is provided by the "standard" party models, which were designed using the Western European model as their basis:
this means there should be well-organized party structures with strong societal linkages that also provide clear ideological or programmatic profiles, without being polarized. So we end up with a comparison that culminates in the decision of whether a party or party system in Africa, Asia, or Latin America conforms to these models. The conclusion is that a party or party system is-in most cases-dysfunctional. However, the perspective on what is functional and dysfunctional is narrowed down to the specifications of these models and tends to 16 There are, of course, many other typologies as well; this, though, seems to be the most acknowledged one.
17
It is interesting to note that an article, "Approaches to the Study of Parties and Party Organization in Contemporary Democracies", based on a paper presented at a prominent conference on political parties in 1994, but published only in 2002, did not even discuss problems related to political parties and party types outside of the northern hemisphere; see Wolinetz (2002) .
18 Wiesendahl (1980) ; Almond and Powell (1984) ; Beyme (2000) ; Gunther and Diamond (2001) ; Randall and Svasand (2002) .
exclude other possible patterns of functionality for democracy; at least theoretically, we should not exclude others. This issue has been highlighted by the puzzle of the "unconsolidated" party system and the consolidation of democracy that is seen in Eastern Europe.
The problem with the functionalist analysis is not only related to the bias of its models, but that it is also not very interested in the historical evolution of particular types of parties nor how they are reproduced. Yet, historical-institutionalist analyses of party and party system development, which could provide some insight, are scant, apart from a few notable exceptions. And, even within these exceptions, some of them focus on very broad societal issues and party systems rather than on single party development and change. 19 Concluding the theoretical and conceptual discussion, the specific Western bias, along with the functionalist approach, makes it difficult to reach a differentiated understanding of how non-European political parties operate. And that the functionalist perspective is also prevalent in political party assistance is evidenced by the application of the mythic party model in the various background papers in which questions about party development and about the genesis of a particular party type are not discussed (for example, Norris 2005) .
Unknown Political Parties
With the third wave of democratization, and particularly after 1989, the interest of political party research shifted to Eastern Europe as well as non-European areas. As indicated above, this shift had some impact on the conceptual discussions within the subdiscipline. However, the new knowledge that has emerged on the basis of systematic empirical studies is unevenly distributed and ambivalent. Among the different research areas, Eastern Europe and Latin America both figure rather prominently compared to research on political parties in Africa and Asia, which is more scant. Moreover, the systematic interest, and with that our accumulated knowledge, focused much more on: party systems (rather than on party organization); how the various types develop; how parties link up with society and perform in parliament, which relates to the core functions of political parties. 20 To make it quite clear: there is, thus, almost no empirical research on party organizations outside of Europe.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a general understanding among scholars about some particular characteristics of political parties that emerged in hybrid and democratic regimes during the third wave, especially outside Europe: weak organizational structures; weak institutionalization, and lack of linkages with society; lack of inner-party democracy; little ideological or programmatic differences between the parties; dominance of informal, personalistic, and clientelistic relationships; high electoral volatility. Three points should be noted, however: 19 Ware (1985; ; Lipset and Rokkan (1967) ; Shefter (1994) ; Daalder (2001) ; Panebianco (1988) . 20 Biezen (2003: 6); Kitschelt et al.(1999) ; Mainwaring (1998) ; Mainwaring and Scully (1995) ; Bendel (1996) • Second, most of these observations describe deficits or "dysfunctions" related to the established model of the "mythic" party. Only the references to the "informal relationships" provide a general hint of how these parties might operate in practice.
• Third, most of the deficits relate to two of the three crucial facets or "faces" of political parties: (a) the organizational structure, and (b) the linkages into society, while (c) the party in parliament (and government) seems not to be that problematic. 21
The three party "faces" are also of major concern for political party assistance, hence why the issue is crucial for this discussion.
The established scholarship about the party organization as a bureaucratic structure, its development, and its change is not yet particularly elaborated and differentiated. It has not been taken beyond the issues discussed by Maurice Duverger (1995) , Leon Epstein (1967) ,
and Angelo Panebianco (1988) . What can be drawn from Duverger's and Epstein's scholarship is the distinction of two or three basic organization models; these are the organizational "thick"-the branch-based, mass membership-party; the "thin"-the decentralized, cadre- Panebianco's institutional approach, more limited because of its narrow focus only on Western Europe, but at the same time more sophisticated than the two previous approaches, does not provide a useful alternative. He includes in his "genetic" party model such organizational origins of the parties under analysis as "territorial penetration" and "diffusion," the existence of external "sponsors," and the involvement of a charismatic leader; the different ori-
21
The three facets resemble, although they are not an exact match, the "three faces" of Katz and Mair (1994) : "party in central office," "on the ground," and "in public office." gins are then linked to different patterns of institutionalization, which implies the "degree of autonomy" in relation to its environment and the "degree of systemness" (Panebianco 1988: 50ff, 63ff) . Again, this institutional approach provides a more sophisticated framework for understanding the organizational development of parties, but still, according to Ware (1996: 102ff), seems to fail in its empirical analysis even for some of the Western European cases.
The discussion of the approaches for the analysis of the organizational structure of political parties, what the types of organization are, and why and how they change, illustrates that the whole issue is still highly controversial and at the same time under researched. This applies not only to European parties, but actually even more so to non-European political parties. Despite this gap in knowledge, three conclusions seem to be important: first, at the same point in time and within one party system "a wide variety of party organizations" can exist;
second, there is no "uniform direction of change" across countries; and third, the general explanation for this phenomenon is that organizational weaknesses as well as the "reforms they initiate" differ from party to party (Ware 1996: 102) .
Regarding the knowledge generated by political party research, we can conclude several points that are relevant for political party assistance. First of all, there is-apart from some generalized observations of deficits and dysfunctions-little systematic empirical knowledge about the various new types of political parties that emerged during the third wave of democratization outside of Europe. This ignorance applies, in particular, to political parties in terms of how they organize (type of organization), how they operate, and why and how they develop and change over time.
Second, the organizations of these parties are different from those of the mass or professional electoral parties of industrialized or post-industrialized societies. It is very likely that Bartolini and Mair's cautious suggestion will prove to be true, especially for non-European societies-that is, these parties will vary "according to the circumstances of their initial formation and development" (Bartolini and Mair 2001: 329) . This might entail these parties possibly not performing all the functions, or they perhaps will be discovered to perform them in a different manner to those ways ascribed to the classical functions of political parties by the mainstream political party scholarship. In addition, parties in new and emerging democracies might perform different political functions from those mentioned in the standard list, some of which might have an indirect effect on the consolidation of democracy; for example, on social and national integration.
Third, the established sequencing of different party eras might suggest not only a fixed historical development pattern, based on the Western European experience (elite, mass, catch-all, and so on), but also that there was one particular party type during each era. However, nothing could be more misleading. Apart from the dominant type of an era, there have always been different political party types at the same time and most often even within the same party system. For example in Germany, just as in many other Western European countries, the branch-and mass-based social democratic party coexisted from the late nineteenth nating one era, to the party type dominating a different era seems not to be a short-term process. Rather, it is a long-term process that might unfold over an entire decade or perhaps even several decades. Furthermore, the parties themselves might have helped shape this movement and bear some responsibility for the outcome. These processes of change are usually linked to profound socioeconomic and political developments that have affected the electorate and to which political parties have reacted in a variety of different ways. The change or transformation of political parties was the outcome of at least one of two different approaches; it was related either to: (1) a reform process consciously directed by the party leadership (for example, the German conservative party during the late nineteenth century organizing a mass base linkage through the Agrarian League (Bund der Landwirte) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the early 1970s organizing an enlarged and stronger membership), or to (2) a piecemeal process of various, more or less erratic, adaptation policies, for which there are many examples, for instance during the transformation from the era of the ideologically committed mass-to the catch-all and professional-electoralist party type.
Conclusion
Political parties are difficult partners for assistance providers, as Peter Burnell and André Gerrits have pointed out (Burnell and Gerrits 2010) . They identify three major reasons for the limited success of international party assistance: first, the "specific method of party aid"; second, the "unfriendly political environment"; and, third, the strong local "ownership" of political parties, which makes external influence so difficult. These are valid points, but as an explanation they do not go far enough. I would argue that the lack of clear concepts of, and strategies for, international party assistance are contributory factors that cannot be ignored. An adequate strategy needs to take into account the particularities of the object it is aiming at, and to include these particularities into the strategic design. It might sound paradoxical, but larger political parties represented in parliament are usually much more independent from external assistance and influence than the government of the country they are operating in. This is simply because "official" external party assistance (apart from, perhaps, in the case of some Eastern European countries) is often marginal compared to parties' income from private sources. These private sources can be local "well-wishers," international corporations, or other countries' governments involved in offering "unofficial," direct party-funding. 22 Hence, the parties can ignore the "pressure" or possibility of conditional support of assistance providers-which might differ quite markedly from their own country's government, which does have to concede to donor demands because its budget is often dependent on major official aid contributions. The implication of this observation deserves more detailed analysis and discussion. The many practical shortcomings of the party assistance programs, described as the "standard method" (Carothers 2006b) , are the side-effects of having goals that are rather vague, which connects with the lack of clear concepts and feeds into weak strategies. As such, one has to draw the conclusion that these weaknesses are partly to blame for the fact that international political party assistance is not always successful, and in some cases even fails.
Another contributory factor to the problems in party aid is the lack of collaboration between political scientists and practitioners. However, as outlined above, established political party scholarship has its own theoretical and conceptual shortcomings, which makes giving profound advice to aid providers difficult. One issue is the controversial view of the role played by political parties in democratization and consolidation processes, and particularly that their contribution might have been overestimated. The other major issue is the lack of systematic empirical knowledge on the type of political parties outside Europe, how they operate and organize, and how and why they develop and change. This requires not only modified concepts, but also, above all, the accumulation of additional knowledge through 22 For example, a number of political parties in Africa, both in power and in opposition, for various reasons get "unofficial" funds from other African governments, from Asian governments, and most likely from Western governments as well; these funds exceed official party aid by a long way: the "rumored" figures suggest in some cases a multiplier factor of at least ten.
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Erdmann: Political Party Research and Political Party Assistance empirical research, which obviously takes time. Regarding the issues here, the dominant functional approach of political party research should be complemented by historicalinstitutional analyses in order to get a better understanding of party development.
Despite the comparatively "weak" scholarship on the organization of political parties outside of Europe, the discussion of problematic issues within the current scholarship on political parties revealed some insights. First, the mythic party model should be abandoned-apart from it being unrealistic to assume that this model could emerge in other parts of the world in the same way as it has in Europe, the major point is that democracy is possible with other types of political parties as well. Second, often different political party types operate next to each other in the same party system; they pose different organizational challenges to assistance providers and therefore require different strategies or approaches. As such, not only does each country with its own party system require, as a whole, a special approach, but each party probably requires such an approach as well, depending on its organizational structure and on its views about what would constitute improvement-views that may differ somewhat between the providers of party assistance, the party leaders, and political analysts in academia.
Finally, the brief references to the historical development of political party types in Western Europe have suggested another crucial insight: political party development is related to, and probably conditioned by, broader and deeper societal change and usually takes place over a period of one, two, or three decades, if not more. However, my impression is that political party aid providers tend not to conceive their programs and projects with perspectives as far-reaching as these in mind. Indeed, the magnitude of such an organizational transformation of political parties should cause us to discuss more frankly the strategic goals of political party assistance. The result of this might include the decision to abandon the "transformative" aim, and, instead, to replace it with less ambitious strategic goals that are clearly defined, more likely to be achieved, and whose effects can be more easily appraised. The relative autonomy of political parties from external influence should be a major component in such a reassessment.
